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Abstract—The pursuit of sustainability motivates microgrids
that depend on distributed resources to produce more renewable
energies. An efficient operation and planning relies on a holistic
framework that takes into account the interdependent decision-
making of the generators of the existing power grids and the
distributed resources of the microgrid in the integrated system. To
this end, we use a Stackelberg game-theoretic framework to study
the interactions between generators (leaders) and microgrids
(followers). Entities on both sides make strategic decisions on
the amount of power generation to maximize their payoffs. Our
framework not only takes into account the economic factors but
also incorporates the stability and efficiency of the smart grid,
such as the power flow constraints and voltage angle regulations.
We present three update schemes for microgrids. In addition, we
develop three other algorithms for generators, and among which
a fully distributed algorithm enabled by phasor measurement
units is proposed. The distributed algorithm merely requires the
information of voltage angles at local buses for updates, and
its convergence to the unique equilibrium is shown. We further
develop the implementation architectures of the update schemes
in the smart grid. Finally, case studies are used to corroborate
the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms.
Index Terms—Renewable energy, Distributed control, Stackel-
berg game, Power flow, Microgrids.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the future smart grid, a large number of green energy
systems that depend on renewable distributed resources, such
as solar, wind, biomass and geothermal, will be built and
integrated with the current main power grids [1]. These
distributed resources can be built into smart microgrids, which
are green energy systems that can operate independently for
self-efficiency. For example, in remote and wild areas, wind
farm consisting of wind turbines is a possible method to
satisfy its local power demands [2], [3], [4]. In addition, smart
microgrids can be connected with the main power system
which is beneficial for grid dependability and resiliency [5].
In this case, the microgrids can enter the power market to sell
renewable energies or buy electricity from the external grid.
The decision of each microgrid is based on its objective and
thus is strategic. Comparing with microgrids, generators in the
power system are generally equipped with a larger capacity,
and they play dominant roles in the grid and determine the
electricity price in the power market. By considering the
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Fig. 1. Illustration of a general two-layer framework of smart grid which
includes a generator network and a microgrid network. Information exchange
between two layers is enabled by the communication network.
power balance and stability issues of the system, generators’
strategy on the power generation will influence the microgrids’
decision, which introduces interdependencies between these
two separate entities in the energy system.
In this paper, we study the interactions and decision inter-
dependencies between multiple generators and microgrids in
the smart grid. Specifically, the generators aim to maximize
their revenues by determining the power generations supplied
to the loads in the system. Based on the generators’ decision,
each microgrid makes a strategy on the amount of renewable
energy injection to the grid and serving for its local demand.
The inclusion of microgrid entities in the power system leads
to a competing mechanism among themselves. In addition,
the strategies of microgrids will in turn impact the decision
of the generators. A general two-layer framework of smart
grid considered is depicted in Fig. 1, in which the upper layer
includes generators and the bottom layer contains microgrids.
Furthermore, the communication network between two layers
is used to exchange information, such as the amount of power
generation and electricity price.
In our framework, the payoffs of generators and microgrids
are related to both physical and economic factors which in-
clude the system power flows, renewable generation capacity,
generation cost and electricity market price [6], [7]. Since
generators play dominant roles in the smart grid and power
market, they can be seen as leaders during the decision-making
processes, while microgrids are regarded as followers. The
complex cross-layer interactions in the smart grid motivate a
Stackelberg game framework to understand the interdependent
decision-making [8]. Note that the generators and microgrids
can be viewed as players in this game. Specifically, the micro-
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grids at the bottom layer play a non-cooperative Nash game,
and they aim to find the best operation and planning decisions
in response to the generators’ strategy. For the integrated
smart grid, the outcome of the strategic decision-making of
the multi-layer and multi-agent interactions is characterized
by Stackelberg equilibrium which yields the generators’ and
microgrids’ strategies jointly.
To design an advanced smart grid energy management
system, we first propose two communication-based update
algorithms for generators and microgrids to enable their
decision-makings. However, the communication distance be-
tween players in the grid can be long which makes the
long-range communication either infeasible or not economical.
To this end, we further develop a PMU-enabled distributed
scheme which merely depends on the phasor measurement
unit (PMU) devices [9] to measure the voltage angles at buses.
With this scheme, the generators and microgrids do not need to
exchange their private information, such as power generation
and voltage angle regulation parameters, and make optimal
decisions independently, preserving high confidentiality for the
players.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
1) We establish a Stackelberg game-theoretic framework to
capture the strategic generation plannings of generators
and microgrids in the smart grid and characterize the
solution via Stackelberg equilibrium (SE).
2) The decision-making of the players considers not only
the economic factors but also the physical constraints of
the power system in the framework.
3) We develop distributed algorithms to find the equilib-
rium strategy and derive sufficient conditions to ensure
its convergence to a unique SE.
4) To implement the proposed update schemes, we propose
a system architecture that builds on PMU and wireless
communication infrastructure of the smart grid.
A. Related Work
Game-theoretic methods have been widely used to capture
the strategic behaviors of agents in infrastructure systems,
e.g., power systems and communication systems [7], [10],
[11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17]. In hierarchical power
systems, a Stackelberg game approach has been used to model
the demand response between users and utility companies
[18], [19], [20]. However, they have mainly focused on the
economic aspect of power generation planning and dispatch,
while physical constraints, such as power flows and voltage
angle regulations, are not included in the framework. Our
work extends their multilevel model to a more practical
one in the Stackelberg game setting and design distributed
algorithms to enable the decision-making of players. The upper
layer’s problem in our framework can be categorized into a
mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC)
[21], [22], and we obtain analytical results first to solve it in
a distributed fashion.
In [23], the authors have establised a two-layer framework
and addressed the problem of microgrids generation planning
in a Nash game by assuming that the generators’ decision are
given. In the current work, we view the generators at the upper
layer as leaders and establish a Stackelberg game framework
to deal with a more challenging two-level decisoin-making
problem. The presented three update schemes for microgrids
in Section V-A mainly follow the work [23]. In this work, we
focus more on the generator/leader side analysis in Section
IV-B and the update algorithms design, especially the novel
fully distributed one for generators presented in Section V-B.
In addition, we design implementation architectures for the
players at both layers in Section VI which differs from [23].
B. Organization of the Paper
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II introduces the preliminaries of power flows. In Section
III, we formulate a Stackelberg game-theoretic framework to
capture the strategic behaviors of microgrids and generators,
and define its solution concept. Game analysis is presented in
Section IV, and the update schemes to find the equilibrium
solution are developed in Section V. Implementation frame-
works of the algorithms in smart grid are designed in Section
VI. Case studies are given in Section VII, and Section VIII
concludes the paper.
C. Notations and Conventions
Some notations and conventions are summarized in Table I.
Superscript ∗ indicates the equilibrium. In addition, subscripts
l and f represent the leader and the follower, respectively.
Microgrid and follower refer to the same entity and used
interchangeably, and similar for the terms of “generator” and
“leader”.
II. POWER FLOW PRELIMINARIES
In a smart power grid consisting of N + 1 buses, let N :=
{r, 1, 2, ..., N}, and r is the slack bus. In addition, denote Pi,
Qi, Vi and θi as the amount of active power injection, reactive
power injection, voltage magnitude and voltage angle at bus
i, i ∈ N , respectively. Then, the power flow equations of the
system with reference to the slack bus r are given by
Pi =
∑
j∈N
ViVj [Gij cos(θi − θj) +Bij sin(θi − θj)],
Qi =
∑
j∈N
ViVj [Gij sin(θi − θj)−Bij cos(θi − θj)],
(1)
for i, j = 1, 2, ..., N, where Gij and Bij represent the real part
and imaginary part of element (i, j) in the admittance matrix
Y ∈ CN×N of the power system. Vr and θr are both known,
and θr = 0 by default.
Furthermore, let P gi and P
l
i be the power generation and
power load at bus i, respectively. Then, the active power
injection at bus i has the relation
Pi = P
g
i − P li , ∀i ∈ N . (2)
Moreover, by considering the balance of the power grid, we
have
∑
i∈N P
g
i =
∑
i∈N P
l
i .
For notational clarity in the system representation and
analysis, the set N excludes the slack bus notation r in the
TABLE I
NOMENCLATURE
P gi power generation at bus i
P gi,max maximum power generation at bus i
P li power load at bus i
Pi active power injection at bus i
θi voltage angle at bus i
Nd number of microgrids
Ng number of generators
ψi unit generation cost of microgrid i
ζ unit market power price
ηi weighting constant of voltage angle regulations at microgrid i
αj weighting constant of voltage angle regulations at generator j
aj , bj , cj parameters in generator j’s generation cost function
Jf,i objective of microgrid i
Jl objective of generators
P P := [P1, P2, ..., PN ]
T ∈ RN
Pd Pd := [P1, P2, ..., PNd ]
T ∈ RNd
Pg Pg := [PNd+1, PNd+2, ..., PN ]
T ∈ RNg
Pgd P
g
d := [P
g
1 , P
g
2 , ..., P
g
Nd
]T ∈ RNd
Pgg P
g
g := [P
g
Nd+1
, P gNd+2
, ..., P gN ]
T ∈ RNg
θ θ := [θ1, θ2, ..., θN ]
T ∈ RN
θd θd := [θ1, θ2, ..., θNd ]
T ∈ RNd
θg θg := [θNd+1, θNd+2, ..., θN ]
T ∈ RNg
Nd set of buses connected with microgrids
Ng set of buses connected with generators
P feasible set of active power injection of all buses
PGf,i set of microgrid i’s generation
Θi set of microgrid i’s voltage angle
PGf,−i Cartesian product of PGf,j , ∀j ∈ Nd \ {i}
Θ−i Cartesian product of Θj , ∀j ∈ Nd \ {i}
PGf,F feasible generation set of game Gf
Θf,F feasible voltage angle profile of game Gf
Ff feasible action set of game Gf
PGl,j set of generator j’s generation
PGl,F feasible generation set of generators
Θl,F feasible voltage angle set of generators
Fl feasible action set of generators
following. In power system analysis, DC approximation is
used for fast calculation of power flows [24]. We assume
that the resistance of transmission lines is much smaller
than its reactance; the voltage angles θi, ∀i ∈ N , are
small, and the magnitudes of voltages Vi, ∀i ∈ N , are
equal to 1 p.u. Then, Qi = 0, ∀i ∈ N , Gij  Bij ,
sin(θi − θj) ≈ θi − θj and cos(θi − θj) ≈ 1. Therefore,
power flow equations (1) can be represented by a set of linear
equations Pi =
∑
j 6=iBij(θi − θj), ∀i, j ∈ N , which can be
rewritten in following matrix form
P = −Bθ, (3)
where P = [P1, P2, ..., PN ]T ∈ RN and θ =
[θ1, θ2, ..., θN ]
T ∈ RN .
Matrix B contains the imaginary components of Y except
the slack bus’s row and column. Note that −B is a symmetric
reduced Laplacian matrix, and hence B is invertible through
the Kirchhoff’s matrix-tree theorem [25]. Since B is nonsin-
gular, (3) can be rewritten as
θ = SP, (4)
where S := [sij ]i,j∈N = −B−1.
Lemma 1 (Lemma 1, [23]). Matrix S is symmetric and
sij ≥ 0, ∀ i, j ∈ N , and especially sii > 0, ∀ i ∈ N .
Lemma 1 is useful for the analysis in Section IV.
III. STACKELBERG GAME-THEORETIC FRAMEWORK
In this section, we present the microgrid side and generator
side game-theoretic models in detail and then define the
equilibrium solution concept.
A. System Overview and Couplings
In a smart energy system including a number of microgrids
and generators, we denote Nd := {1, 2, ..., Nd} as a set of Nd
buses that are connected with the microgrids, and they are able
to generate renewable energies such as wind and solar power.
In addition, denote Ng := {Nd + 1, Nd + 2, ..., N} = N \Nd
as a set of Ng buses that are generators. The slack bus r is
further chosen to serve as a base of the power grid. For bus
i ∈ N having local loads, its value P li is specified ahead of
time. Both generators and microgrids in the system need to
determine their amount of power generation, and they have a
maximum generation limit 0 ≤ P gi ≤ P gi,max, ∀i ∈ N . Note
that microgrid’s generation capacity P gi,max, i ∈ Nd is dy-
namically changing due to the intermittent nature of renewable
generations. For convenience, the framework is studied for a
given P gi,max in this paper, and it can be generalized to the
dynamic case naturally. Without loss of generality, we set the
power loads at the generator buses to 0, i.e., P li = 0, ∀i ∈ Ng ,
then Pg = Pgg .
As the framework shown in Fig. 1, generators at the upper
layer are viewed as a leader, and they have the priority of
determining the amount of power generations supplied to the
loads at the lower layer. Microgrids are followers in this
generation game, and their decisions need to take the strategies
of the upper layer into account. In particular, the interactions
between microgrids constitute a Nash game, and the couplings
between two layers are captured by a Stackelberg game-
theoretic framework.
B. Microgrid (Follower) Side Model
Before formulating the Nash game between microgrids,
we present underlying assumptions of the model. First, the
topology of the whole power system is known to all players.
This is justifiable since the parameters of power transmission
lines are often known. Second, the constraints of each player
are common information, and each player is aware of the
physical constraints when making decisions. This indicates
that players should take the power flow constraints (3) into
account. Third, during microgrids’ updates, the power gener-
ations of generators are fixed. This assumption is reasonable
since microgrids can regulate themselves more quickly than
generators, and they can be seen as followers in this game
[7], [18], [26]. Furthermore, PMUs are installed at buses to
measure the voltage angles in the smart grid. The game played
among the microgrids are presented as follows.
Let Gf := {Nd, {PGf,i,Θi}i∈Nd , {Jf,i}i∈Nd ,P} be a game
with a set Nd of Nd microgrids. Here, we use subscript f to
denote the follower for convenience. {PGf,i,Θi} is the action
set of microgrid i, where PGf,i := {P gi ∈ R+ | 0 ≤ P gi ≤
P gi,max}; Denote {PGf,−i,Θ−i} as Cartesian product of all
microgrids’ action sets except ith one. P is the feasible set
of active power injections defined by constraint (3). Denote
the feasible set of power generations of all buses in the grid
as PG which can be obtained by using P through (2). Then,
the feasible generation set of game Gf can be defined by
PGf,F :=
( ⊗i∈Nd PGf,i) ∩ PG . The feasible voltage angle
profile Θf,F of the followers can be obtained based on
PGf,F and (3). Then, the feasible action set of microgrids is
Ff := PGf,F×Θf,F . Denote (P gf,−i, θf,−i) by the actions of all
microgrids except the i’s one for convenience. The followers’
game Gf is coupled through the power flow constraints (3).
The cost function Jf,i : PGf,i × [0, pi] → R for microgrid i
is given by
Jf,i(P
g
i , θi) = ψiP
g
i + ζ(P
l
i − P gi ) +
1
2
η2i θ
2
i , i ∈ Nd, (5)
where ψi is the unit cost of generated power for microgrid
i; ζ is the unit price of renewable energy for sale defined
by the power market, and ηi is a weighting parameter that
indicates the importance of regulations of voltage angle at bus
i. Note that term ψiP
g
i + ζ(P
l
i − P gi ) captures the renewable
generation costs and possible sale revenue of microgrid i. In
addition, term 12η
2
i θ
2
i indicates that smaller voltage phasor θi
is preferred to improve the power quality in the grid.
Therefore, for a given set Pgg := [P
g
Nd+1
, P gNd+2, ..., P
g
N ]
T
of power generations from the generator network, the follower
(microgrid) i’s problem (FPi) is given by
FPi : min
P gi ,θi
Jf,i(P
g
i , θi)
s.t. P = −Bθ,
0 ≤ P gi ≤ P gi,max, i ∈ Nd.
Note that the generators’ output Pg in P presents in every
FPi.
C. Generator (Leader) Side Model
For the generators in the smart grid, we denote PGl,j as the
action set of player j, where PGl,j := {P gj ∈ R+ | 0 ≤ P gj ≤
P gj,max}, j ∈ Ng. For convenience, the subscript l stands for
leader. In addition, denote the feasible generation and voltage
angle sets of generators as PGl,F and Θl,F , respectively, and
Fl := PGl,F × Θl,F . Denote (P gl,−j , θl,−j) by the actions of
all generators except the j’s one. Remind that the feasible
action sets of microgrids and generators are coupled through
(3). Each generator j ∈ Ng generates an amount of P gj power
at a cost Cj(P
g
j ), where Cj : PGl,j → R+ is the cost function
for generator j. Moreover, we assume that Cj are smooth
and convex functions, ∀j ∈ Ng . A typical choice of Cj is
of quadratic form, i.e., Cj(P
g
j ) =
1
2aj(P
g
j )
2
+ bjP
g
j + cj , j ∈
Ng,[27], [28], where aj > 0, bj ≥ 0, and cj ≥ 0 are cost
coefficients for generator j. The cost function for generator j is
Jl,j(P
g
j , θj) = Cj(P
g
j ) +
1
2αjθ
2
j , j ∈ Ng, where the second
term captures the power quality issue. Specifically, smaller
voltage phasor indicates higher power supply efficiency and
quality. For generators, the global cost is represented by
Jl(P
g
g,θg) =
∑
j∈Ng Cj(P
g
j ) +
1
2αjθ
2
j , which jointly takes
the generation costs and power quality into account. Therefore,
the leader’s optimization problem (OP1) is formulated as
OP : min
P gj ,θj
∑
j∈Ng
Cj(P
g
j ) +
1
2
αjθ
2
j
s.t. P = −Bθ,
0 ≤ P gj ≤ P gj,max, ∀j ∈ Ng,
Outcome strategy of FPi, ∀i ∈ Nd.
OP can be seen as a modified economic power dispatch
problem [7], [29], [10], since OP includes the constraints from
the microgrids layer.
Connections between OP and FPi: Remind that the deci-
sions of microgrids yield by FPi, ∀i ∈ Nd, are determined for
a given generators’ action Pgg , and these decisions constitute
the constraints of the outcome strategy of FPi, ∀i ∈ Nd, in
the OP. Hence, due to this hierarchical smart grid structure,
generators at the upper layer (solve OP) need to anticipate the
microgrids’ response Pgd (solve FPi,∀i ∈ Nd) at the lower
layer when making decisions.
Note that the outcome strategy profile of microgrids is
characterized by a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, the OP can
be categorized into a mathematical program with equilibrium
constraints (MPEC) [21], [22]. The hierarchical generation
game including the microgrids and generators constitutes a
Stackelberg game denoted by G.
D. Stackelberg Equilibrium
The leaders (generators) determine their power generation
and announce it to the followers (microgrids). The equilibrium
of the microgrids in a Stackelberg game G is any strategy
that constitutes an optimal response to the one adopted and
announced by the generators. Formally, the Stackelberg equi-
librium (SE) is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Stackelberg Equilibrium): The strategy set
(Pg∗d ,θ
∗
d,P
g∗
g ,θ
∗
g) constitutes a Stackelberg equilibrium of
game G if the following conditions are satisfied:
(i): (Pg∗d ,θ
∗
d) ∈ Ff is a Nash equilibrium for microgrids,
i.e., ∀i ∈ Nd,
Jf,i(P
g∗
i , θ
∗
i ) ≤ Jf,i(P gi , θi), ∀(P gi , θi) ∈ Φi(P g∗f,−i, θ∗f,−i),
where Φi(P
g∗
f,−i, θ
∗
f,−i) is a projected action set defined by
Φi(P
g∗
f,−i, θ
∗
f,−i) := {(P gi , θi) : (P gi , θi;P g∗f,−i, θ∗f,−i) ∈ Ff}.
1To avoid ambiguity, we use the abbreviation OP instead of LP to denote
the leader’s optimization problem.
(ii): (Pg∗g ,θ
∗
g) ∈ Fl satisfies, ∀i ∈ Ng ,
Jl
(
Pg∗g ,θ
∗
g; Γ(P
g∗
g ,θ
∗
g)
)
≤ Jl
(
P gi , P
g∗
l,−i, θi, θ
∗
l,−i; Γ
(
P gi , P
g∗
l,−i, θi, θ
∗
l,−i
))
,
where Γ(Pg∗g ,θ
∗
g) denotes the optimal response of microgrids
given (Pg∗g ,θ
∗
g). For a given pair (P
g
g,θg) ∈ Fl of generators,
the optimal responses of all microgrids constitute a Nash
equilibrium satisfying condition (i).
In the following, our goal is to find the equilibrium strategies
of generators and microgrids jointly.
IV. STACKELBERG GAME ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the strategic behaviors of micro-
grids and generators, respectively, and also show the existence
and uniqueness of Stackelberg equilibrium of game G.
A. Microgrid Side Analysis
Before developing algorithms to find the solution to FPi, we
obtain an analytical solution for microgrids in this subsection.
Note that the generation profile Pg is fixed during the analysis.
First, plugging θ = SP into (5) yields
J˜f,i(P
g
i , P
g
−i) = ψiP
g
i +ζ(P
l
i −P gi )+
1
2
η2i (
∑
j∈N
sijPj)
2, (6)
for i ∈ Nd, where J˜f,i : PGf,i × PGf,−i → R, and it is strictly
convex on P gi . Therefore, the first-order optimality condition
of (6) yields ψi − ζ + η2i (
∑
j∈N sijPj)sii = 0. By defining
gi := siiPi, g¯−i :=
∑
j 6=i∈N sijPj and since sii 6= 0 by
Lemma 1, we obtain gi = ζ−ψiη2i sii − g¯−i which can be rewritten
as Pi = 1sii (
ζ−ψi
η2i sii
− g¯−i), i ∈ Nd. For clarity, define γi :=
ζ−ψi
η2i sii
and Pmaxi := P
g
i,max − P li . Then, we further obtain
HP∗d = q, (7)
where H := [ sijsii ]i,j∈Nd , q := [qi]i∈Nd = [
γi
sii
−∑
j∈Ng
sij
sii
Pj ]i∈Nd , and P
∗
d := [P
∗
i ]i∈Nd = [P
g∗
i − P li ]i∈Nd .
Remark: For a given Pgg , there exists a one-to-one mapping
between Pgd and θd through (3). Hence, the strategy pair
(Pgd,θd) can be equivalently captured by P
g
d. The same
analysis applies for Pgg and (P
g
g,θg) when given P
g
d. In
the following, we refer to Pgg and P
g
d as the strategies of
generators and microgrids, respectively, for clarity.
Lemma 2. Matrix H is invertible.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Regarding the microgrids’ strategy, we have Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 (Theorem 1, [23]). For a given Pg and an
appropriate S, the renewable energy generation game Gf
admits a unique Nash equilibrium, and the net power injection
of player i, i ∈ Nd, to the grid is given by
Pi =

−P li , if γi ≤ g¯−i − siiP li ,
Pmaxi , if γi ≥ g¯−i + siiPmaxi ,
1
sii
(γi − g¯−i), otherwise.
(8)
B. Generator Side Analysis
The generators in the grid are leaders and thus have a
complete information of microgrids, such as their power loads,
incentives of voltage regulations and generation costs. The
inclusion of microgrids in the smart grid is to make the system
greener and more efficient. For the followers, zero power
generation clearly makes the microgrid highly underutilized,
while maximum power generation puts strict constraints on the
working hours and reliability issues of microgrids. Therefore,
in general, generators will choose strategies that lead the
microgrids achieving an inner solution at the equilibrium.
Equivalently, generators regard that the best response dynam-
ics of microgrids are given by (7).
Therefore, via Lemma 2, the best response of microgrids
can be written as Pd = H−1q, and the optimization problem
OP for the generators can be reformulated rigorously as
OP′ : min
P gj ,θj
∑
j∈Ng
Cj(P
g
j ) +
1
2
αjθ
2
j
s.t. P = −Bθ,
Pd = H
−1q,
0 ≤ P gj ≤ P gj,max, ∀j ∈ Ng.
To simplify OP′, we have the following Lemma.
Lemma 3. The constraints P = −Bθ and Pd = H−1q can
be captured by
T1θg + T2q−Pg = 0, (9)
where T1 := B3B−11 B2 − B4 ∈ RNg×Ng and T2 :=
B3B
−1
1 H
−1 ∈ RNg×Nd .
Proof. See Appendix B. 
One challenge in OP′ is the box constraint for generators,
i.e., 0 ≤ P gj ≤ P gj,max, ∀j ∈ Ng . Note that in the objective
function of OP′, each generator j, j ∈ Ng , has a weighting
parameter αj indicating the incentive of regulating the voltage
angle at his bus. When generator j cares more about the
generation cost rather than the voltage regulation, then small
αj is chosen. In this case, due to the monotonically increasing
quadratic function Cj(P
g
j ), the amount of generated power of
generators should be relatively small to optimize the objective,
and 0 ≤ P gj ≤ P gj,max is naturally satisfied. We focus on this
scenario and aim to obtain analytical results for generators in
the following. The leader’s problem OP′ can be simplified as
OP′′ : min
P gj ,θj
∑
j∈Ng
Cj(P
g
j ) +
1
2
αjθ
2
j
s.t. T1θg + T2q−Pg = 0.
The Lagrangian of OP′′ is
L(P gj , θj ,µ) =
∑
j∈Ng
Cj(P
g
j )+
1
2
αjθ
2
j+µ
T (T1θg+T2q−Pg),
where µ := [µ1, µ2, ..., µNg ] is the Lagrange multiplier vector.
The first-order optimality condition ∇L = 0 yields
∂L
∂P gj
= ajP
g
j + bj − µj −
∑
i∈Nd
µTT2(i)
sij
sii
= 0, (10)
∂L
∂θj
= αjθj + µ
TT1(j) = 0, ∀j ∈ Ng, (11)
where T1 = [T1(1), ..., T1(Ng)] and T2 =
[T2(1), ..., T2(Nd)]. In addition, the complementarity
slackness condition is the same as constraint (9). Then,
putting (9), (10) and (11) in a matrix form yields
WX = b, (12)
where X = [Pgg
T ,µT ,θg
T ]T ; 0 = [0]Ng×Ng ; I is an Ng-
dimensional identity matrix;
W =
 A1 T3 − I 00 TT1 A2
T4 − I 0 T1
 ;
A1 = diag(a1, a2, ..., aNg ); A2 = diag(α1, α2, ..., αNg );
b = [−b1, ...,−bNg , 0, ..., 0, T5(1), ..., T5(Ng)]T ;
T3(i, j) = −
∑
p∈Nd
T2(j, p)
spi
spp
;
T4(i, j) = −
∑
p∈Nd
T2(i, p)
sp(p+j)
spp
;
T5(i) = −
∑
q∈Nd
T2(i, q)
γq
sqq
, ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., Ng}.
Hence, to solve OP′′, we need to solve the system of equations
(12). The invertibility of W is crucial for the uniqueness of
SE solution, and we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Matrix W in (12) is invertible.
Proof. See Appendix C. 
Based on Lemma 4, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1. A unique Stackelberg equilibrium solution exists
in the game G, since matrix W is invertible.
Proof. From Theorem 1, we know that each microgrid has
a unique solution in the Nash game Gf for a given Pg . In
addition, since W is invertible, generators admit a unique
solution Pg in the leader’s problem. Therefore, game G
possesses a unique Stackelberg equilibrium. 
This section has characterized the SE solution to game G
through analysis on both microgrid and generator sides. In the
ensuing section, we will discuss methodologies and design
algorithms to find the SE.
V. DISTRIBUTED UPDATE SCHEMES
We know that game G has a unique equilibrium solution
from Section IV. In this section, we aim to design update
schemes for the generators and microgrids, respectively, to
compute the Stackelberg equilibrium strategy.
A. Microgrid Side Update Schemes
The update schemes of microgrids mainly follow the pre-
vious work [23], and we present them briefly as follows for
completeness.
1) Iterative Update Algorithm (IUA): The IUA is a scheme
that all microgrids update their strategies simultaneously. At
time step n, the update for microgrid i, i ∈ Nd, is
P
(n+1)
i = Ψi(γi, g¯
(n)
−i ) = min
(
Pmaxi , max
[− P li ,
1
sii
(γi −
∑
j∈Ng
sijPj −
∑
j 6=i∈Nd
sijP
(n)
j )
])
.
(13)
2) Random Update Algorithm (RUA): The IUA requires
that every player updates their decisions in parallel which is
impractical in cases without synchronization mechanism. One
more practical update scheme is RUA. Specifically, microgrids
update their strategies with a predefined probability 0 < τi <
1, i ∈ Nd at each step. The RUA is given by
P
(n+1)
i =
{
Ψi(γi, g¯
(n)
−i ), with probability τi,
P
(n)
i , with probability 1− τi,
where Ψi is defined in (13).
3) PMU-Enabled Distributed Algorithm (PDA): The PDA
does not require the synchronization mechanism as that in
IUA. Its update fashion is similar to RUA but requires much
less information. Notice that θ = SP leads to
∑
j∈Ng
sijPj +∑
j 6=i∈Nd
sijPj = θi − siiPi, ∀i ∈ Nd. By incorporating it into
(13), each microgrid can update the decision by knowing the
voltage angle at his bus at the current step. Therefore, the PDA
for player i, i ∈ Nd, is
P
(n+1)
i = min
(
Pmaxi , max
[− P li ,
1
sii
(γi − θ(n)i + siiP (n)i )
])
.
(14)
A critical property of the update algorithm is its conver-
gence. Specifically, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (Theorem 3, [23]). The PMU-enabled distributed
algorithm of microgrid is globally stable and can converge to
the unique equilibrium point almost surely if
τ¯ · max
i,j 6=i∈Nd
sij
sii
(Nd − 1) < τ, (15)
where τ¯ and τ denote the upper and lower bounds of proba-
bility τi, respectively, ∀i ∈ Nd.
B. Generator Side Update Schemes
For the generators in the smart grid, their equilibrium
strategies are given by WX = b in (12). To obtain the
solution, we adopt Guass-Seidel iterative method [30] when
the inverse of matrix W is complex to compute. Specifically,
the update scheme is given by
X
(t+1)
i =
1
Wii
[
bi −
i−1∑
k=1
WikX
(t+1)
k −
3Ng∑
k=i+1
WikX
(t)
k
]
(16)
for i = 1, 2, ..., 3Ng , where t is the time step index, and W =
[Wik]i,k∈{1,2,...,3Ng}. Putting (16) in a matrix format yields
X(t+1) = MX(t) + D−1b, (17)
where M = D−1(D − W), and D = A1 0 00 TRU1 0
T4 − I 0 TLL1
. D includes the lower triangular
portion of matrix W. Note that sub-matrices TRU1 and
TLL1 in D represent the upper-right and lower-left triangular
matrices of T1, respectively. The invertibility of matrix D in
(17) is critical. We have the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Matrix D is invertible, and thus (17) is feasible.
Proof. See Appendix D. 
Since (16) is a linear difference equation, a necessary
and sufficient condition for its convergence to the unique
equilibrium point is that the eigenvalues of matrix M are in
the unit circle, that is,
ρ(M) < 1, (18)
where ρ(·) denotes the spectral radius operator. Note that
matrix M is related to the smart grid topology and the constant
parameters in the leader’s objective. Therefore, when those
grid and objective parameters are appropriate such that matrix
M satisfies (18), the iterative algorithm (16) converges. Under
the case that (18) does not hold, then the generators can
directly solve WX = b through X = W−1b, since matrix
W is invertible by Lemma 4.
Besides the public known power system topology, the only
required information from the followers during the updates of
(16) is γi in b which is related to the unit renewable generation
cost ψi and the incentive of voltage regulation ηi, for i ∈
Nd. In the following, we present three methods with different
information structures to enable the leader’s updates.
1) Knowledge of Private Parameters (KPP): The first ap-
proach is that microgrids inform generators with their param-
eters ψi and ηi, ∀i ∈ Nd, in advance. Then, generators can
determine their strategy P∗g by using (16) directly without
any further interactions with microgrids. The drawback of
this method is that generation costs and incentives of voltage
regulation are private information of microgrids, and thus may
not be available to generators.
2) Knowledge of Generation Decisions (KGD): To address
the privacy issue in KPP, an alternative approach to obtain
parameters γi, ∀i ∈ Nd, is that generators first announce their
generations Pg to microgrids, and then microgrids send the
best response renewable energy profile Pd back to generators.
The information about power generations is much less private
than the specific parameters, such as ψi and ηi, ∀i ∈ Nd. In
addition, remind that q =
[
γi
sii
−∑j∈Ng sijsii Pj]i∈Nd , then γi
can be obtained from q = HPd.
3) Knowledge of Bus Voltage Angles (KBA): Though KGD
preserves high confidentiality for microgrids, leaders still need
the feedback information of amount of renewable generations
from the followers, and thus requires a two-way smart grid
communication infrastructure. Remind that the communication
channels from generators to microgrids can be used to transmit
information including the power generation and market power
price. To reduce the communication cost, we propose a fully
distributed update scheme for the generators, and therefore
simplifies the two-way communication model to a single-way
one.
The main focus is to design a distributed mechanism to
obtain parameters γi, for i ∈ Nd. Note that we have T1θg +
T2q−Pg = 0 which can be rewritten as
T2Υ = Pg −T1θg + T2Λ, (19)
where Υ :=
[
γi
sii
]
i∈Nd , and Λ :=
[∑
j∈Ng
sij
sii
Pj
]
i∈Nd . In the
Stackelberg game, when generators announce their strategy Pg
to microgrids, they can obtain a voltage angle profile θg by
using PMUs after the best response of microgrids. Therefore,
the right hand side of (19) is a complete information to the
generators. However, to obtain vector Υ, another challenge is
that the number of generators is generally less than the number
of microgrids, i.e., Ng < Nd. Thus, T2 is an underdetermined
matrix, and solving (19) gives an infinite number of solutions
if there are any.
To address this problem, one possible way is to seek an
estimation of Υˆ based on (19). However, to remove the
inconsistency between the measured voltage angle θg and the
anticipated one due to the parameter estimation error is an
obstacle and hence makes this method infeasible. Realizing
that separate parameters γi, ∀i ∈ Nd, are challenging to obtain,
we turn to investigate the form of T5(j), for j ∈ Ng . Remind
that for i ∈ Ng , T5(i) = −
∑
q∈Nd T2(i, q)
γq
sqq
. Then, for
convenience, we define
T˜5(i) :=
∑
q∈Nd
T2(i, q)
γq
sqq
, i ∈ Ng, (20)
which is a weighted aggregation of γq, ∀q ∈ Nd. Denote
T˜5 = [T˜5(i)]i∈Ng , and notice that vector T2Υ on the left
hand side of (19) is equivalent to T˜5, i.e., T2Υ = T˜5. Since
the right hand side of (19) is known to the generators, then,
the unknown information T˜5 can be obtained subsequently.
Based on the chosen strategy Pg and the corresponding
best response θg measured by PMUs, generators can calculate
Pg − T1θg + T2Λ and assign it to T˜5. Then, vector b
in (17) is determined, and thus generators can update their
strategies through algorithm (16) in a fully distributed fashion.
The communications from microgrids to generators are not
required which make KBA more advantageous than KPP
and KGD. The single-way information flow not only reduces
the communication construction costs, but also improves the
quality of service due to the enhancement of signal-to-noise-
ratio of channels. Particularly, in cases where the microgrids
use PDA, and also they know the market power price from the
Internet which is an adopted mechanism currently, then the
smart grid communication infrastructures between two layers
and among microgrids are not needed.
C. Combined Distributed Update Algorithm
We have proposed three update schemes for microgrids and
generators, respectively. Different combinations of these meth-
ods have various features. We present some key characteristics
including communication cost, privacy level and algorithm
update efficiency of each combination in Table II. Specifically,
the communication cost for each scheme is measured through
the number of communication links between the players in
the grid. By using KBA, the generators do not need to know
microgrid parameters ψi and ηi (KPP), ∀i ∈ Nd, and the
generation decisions of microgrids (KGD), and hence reduces
the number of communication links from the microgrids to the
generators. From the microgrids’ side, PDA does not require
communication links from the generators to the microgrids
and the ones between microgrids themselves as IUA and
RUA do. Therefore, the implementations of strategies combing
IUA/RUA with KPP/KGD require the largest communica-
tions investment in terms of the total number of links. By
using IUA&KPP as the benchmark, we can measure the
communication costs of other strategies. For example, using
KBA&PDA strategy saves the communication infrastructures
between generator and microgrid layers as well as those within
microgrids. Therefore, the communication cost is ultra low.
In contrast, PDA&KPP yields a low communication cost by
reducing the number of required communications between
microgrids.
The privacy level of each strategy is determined by the type
of required information for updates of each agent. The local
cost parameters of ψi and ηi, ∀i ∈ Nd, are direct private and
sensitive information of a microgrid. In addition, individual
decisions of the other players are viewed as indirect private
information. However, PMU measurements on the buses are
viewed as the common information shared between the gener-
ator and the microgrids. Therefore, the scheme, PDA&KBA,
adopts PMUs that measure the bus angles to enable the
decision updates of players preserves the highest level of
privacy. Note that at the microgrids side, when a microgrid
uses IUA or RUA strategy, it needs to know the decisions
of the other players in the grid as well. Using the combined
strategy PDA&KBA as the benchmark, we can determine
the privacy level of other strategies including IUA/RUA and
KPP/KGD. For example, the combined update scheme with
PDA&KGD has to disclose generation decisions, and hence
its privacy level can be deemed as high instead of ultra high.
The worst cases in terms of privacy are IUA/RUA and KPP
since they disclose private parameters ψi and ηi, ∀i ∈ Nd, and
the generation decisions at the same time. We can further rank
the privacy level of other strategies in a similar fashion. By
comparison, the scheme combing PDA and KBA is preferred,
since its communication cost is ultra low, and it preserves high
privacy for microgrids. The update efficiency is measured via
the time required by the system to reach an SE point which is
mainly affected by the update fashion of microgrids. Generally,
the update efficiency of IUA outperforms those of RUA and
PDA. However, when update probability τi of microgrid i is
large, then the efficiency of IUA, RUA and PDA are without
significant difference.
By combining the PDA for microgrids and the Guass-Seidel
iterative method incorporating with KBA for generators, we
arrive at a fully distributed update scheme to compute the
Stackelberg equilibrium solution in the two-level smart grid.
For clarity, the scheme is summarized in Algorithm 1.
TABLE II
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COMBINED UPDATE SCHEMES
Strategy
Metric Communication
Cost
Privacy
Level
Update
Efficiency
IUA & KPP High Low Ultra High
IUA & KGD High Medium High
IUA & KBA Medium Medium High
RUA & KPP High Low Medium
RUA & KGD High Medium Medium
RUA & KBA Medium Medium Medium
PDA & KPP Low Medium Medium
PDA & KGD Low High Medium
PDA & KBA Ultra Low Ultra High Medium
Algorithm 1 Distributed Scheme to Search for SE Strategy
1: Initialize P li , P
max
i , τi, ∀i ∈ Nd, P gj,max, ∀j ∈ Ng , error
tolerance 1, 2
2: For n = 1 and t = 1, arbitrarily choose feasible P (n)i for
i ∈ Nd, and P (t)i for i ∈ Ng
3: Repeat for n if needed
4: for i = 1, 2, ..., Nd
5: Microgrid i measures its bus voltage angle θ(n)i by PMU
6: Random update P (n+1)i through distributed scheme (14)
7: end for
8: if ‖Pg(n+1)d −Pg(n)d ‖∞ > 1
9: n = n+ 1, and go to step 3
10: else
11: Go to step 13
12: end
13: If t = 1, generators measure θ(1)g by PMUs, then calculate
P
(1)
g − T1θ(1)g + T2Λ(1) and assign it to T˜5. Obtain
unkown parameters via (20). Otherwise, go to step 23
14: Repeat for t if needed
15: for j = 1, 2, ..., 3Ng
16: Update X(t+1)j through (16)
17: end for
18: if ‖Pg(t+1)g −Pg(t)g ‖∞ > 2
19: t = t+ 1, and go to step 13
20: else
21: Pg∗g = P
g(t+1)
g , and go to step 3
22: end
23: Pg∗d = P
g(n+1)
d
24: return Pg∗d and P
g∗
g
Remark: The convergence of Algorithm 1 is guaranteed
when Theorem 2 for microgrids and condition (18) for gener-
ators are both satisfied.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION ARCHITECTURES OF ALGORITHMS
IN SMART GRID
In this section, we develop implementation architectures for
the proposed algorithms in smart grid.
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Fig. 2. Illustration of the overall implementation architecture of Algorithm 1. Generators make decisions collaboratively via internal communications. PMUs
are installed at buses which enable the updates. In addition, the local control framework of microgrids based on the measured bus voltage angle is designed.
A. Communication-Based Implementation Architecture
Different schemes developed in Section V require vari-
ous implementation frameworks. Specifically, for microgrid’s
update, IUA and RUA need the support of communication
channels both from generators to microgrids and among mi-
crogrids themselves. For generator’s update, communications
from microgrids to generators are necessary for KPP and KGD
enabled algorithms. Communication networks in the smart
grid can be realized by a number of technologies, such as
Internet protocol, power line communication (PLC), WiMAX,
ZigBee, optical-fiber and cellular networks [31]. Though PLC
is ubiquitous in the power systems, and it has low installation
cost, there exists high noise over power lines which causes
distortion of signals. The application of wireless technologies
can lead to packet losses due to signal interferences and hence
impact the efficiency of update algorithms. If the transmitted
data between two layers in the framework is modified due to
cyber attacks, then the equilibrium outcome of the generation
game G would be different. Since the distance between players
can be large, the Internet-based networks are more suitable for
our framework in terms of signal attenuation and capacity. The
communication-based implementation architecture is shown in
Fig. 1 in which both generators and microgrids rely on the
communication infrastructures for decision updates.
B. PMU-Based Implementation Architecture
When buses in the smart grid are equipped with PMUs,
the convenient PMU-enabled and KBA-enabled distributed
algorithms can be deployed by microgrids and generators
for updates, respectively. The combined algorithm reduces
communication infrastructures among microgrids and between
two layers as shown in Fig. 1. In Algorithm 1, generators make
use of the measured voltage angles by PMUs only once to
determine the unknown parameters. Thus, generators’ actions
are more related to the offline iterative scheme (16) which does
not include the real-time measurements of voltage angle at
buses. Different from the leader, the decision-making of each
follower depends on its bus voltage angle at every update step.
Therefore, the local control framework of microgrid needs to
incorporate the features of smart grid operation.
The overall implementation architecture of Algorithm 1
is depicted in Fig. 2. Specifically, PMUs are installed at
buses to measure the voltage angle. Compared with the
communication-based architecture in Fig. 1, the hierarchical
framework in Fig. 2 does not include communications both
between the two layers and within the lower microgrids
network. The detailed control framework to implement the
PMU-enabled algorithm of microgrids is also shown in Fig.
2. Specifically, the PMU measures the voltage angle θ(n)i
at bus i at step n, and sends it to the PDA-enabled local
controller. Then, the controller generates a signal that informs
the microgrid to dispatch an appropriate amount of renewable
energy to the external grid and local load, respectively. The
negative P (n+1)i indicates that microgrid i buys power from
the external grid.
VII. CASE STUDIES
We validate our proposed algorithms via case studies based
on a 6-bus system shown in Fig. 3. Specifically, buses 1,
2 and 3 are connected to microgrids that generate wind,
solar, geothermal renewable energies, respectively, and form a
follower network. Buses 4 and 6 are connected to generators
which are leaders in the power generation game. Denote the
generators at buses 4 and 6 as generator 1 and generator 2,
respectively. In addition, bus 5 is selected as the slack bus.
Details of the power system model can be found in [28].
Without loss of generality, we set ηi = η = 103, P
g
i,max =
100MW, ∀i ∈ Nd, and P gj,max = 800MW, ∀j ∈ Ng .
In addition, some parameters of generators are as follows:
α4 = 50 × 104, α6 = 30 × 104, a4 = 0.05$/MW2,
a6 = 0.08$/MW
2 b4 = 6$/MW, b6 = 8$/MW, c4 = 130$
and c6 = 120$. The selection of parameters related to the
maximum generations and the generation costs can refer to
Chapter 3 of [28]. The error tolerance constants are equal
to 1 = 2 = 10−3. The market electricity price and the
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Fig. 3. 6-bus power system model. Buses 1, 2 and 3 are connected to
microgrids that generate renewable energies, and they constitute the lower
layer. Generators connected to buses 4 and 6 are leaders, and they form the
upper layer in the smart grid.
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Fig. 4. The strategy of generators during updates.
unit renewable generation cost of microgrids are equal to
ζ = 140$/MWh, ψ1 = 110$/MWh, ψ2 = 150$/MWh
and ψ3 = 80$/MWh, respectively[32]. The local loads at
microgrids are given by P l1 = 220MW, P
l
2 = 350MW and
P l3 = 170MW, respectively. The subscript number of above
parameters corresponds to the bus index in the smart grid.
In the case studies, the update probabilities of three micro-
grids are chosen as follows: τ1 = 0.7, τ2 = 0.7 and τ3 = 0.75.
Thus, τ¯ = 0.75 and τ = 0.7. Note that these probabilities cor-
respond to the frequencies of microgrids’ decision-makings.
Specifically, larger value of update probability indicates more
frequent decision updates. The time scale of microgrid’s each
update is critical. Specifically, the iterative updates of micro-
grids are faster than their load dynamics, and hence the loads
can be seen as fixed in the game. Before finding the equilib-
rium solution via the distributed algorithm, we first verify the
convergence of the update scheme by checking the sufficient
conditions in Theorem 2 and (18). The components in matrix
S that correspond to microgrids constitute a submatrix S′, and
based on S′ we obtain maxi,j 6=i∈Nd
sij
sii
= 0.4246. Then we
can calculate τ¯ ·maxi,j 6=i∈Nd sijsii (Nd−1) = 0.637 < τ = 0.7.
Therefore, the sufficient condition in Theorem 2 is satisfied. In
addition, the constructed matrix W is invertible which verifies
Lemma 4, and we have ρ(M) = 0.885 which also meets
the condition (18). Hence, the distributed Algorithm 1 can
converge to the unique equilibrium point in this case study.
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Fig. 5. (a) and (b) show the results of the renewable generations and bus
voltage angles of microgrids by using the PMU-enabled distributed algorithm,
respectively.
Next, we aim to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium solution
of players in the smart grid by using Algorithm 1. The
generators first choose an arbitrary feasible decision profile
P
g(1)
g , and microgrids will respond to it in a fully distributed
manner. After the followers reaching an equilibrium, gener-
ators measure the voltage angles at their buses and obtain
vector T˜5 = [610.5, 186.3]T which completes the unknown
information extraction through KBA for the leader network.
Then, the generators can determine their best strategies via
offline updates (16), and the results are shown in Fig. 4. Note
that the time scale of generators’ offline decision updates is
negligible comparing with that of microgrids’ updates, and the
generators implement the strategy at equilibrium in Fig. 4. We
can see that the generators’ equilibrium strategy is given by
Pg∗g = [346.3, 151.2]
TMW.
The change of power generation of leaders will influence
the decision-making of followers. After generators making
the decision Pg∗g , the best response strategies of microgrids
including the renewable generations and voltage angles are
shown in Fig. 5. Note that the voltage angles are small,
indicating that the DC approximation performs well [7], [24],
[33]. The microgrids can reach the equilibrium point in 14 time
steps by using the PMU-enabled distributed algorithm, and the
equilibrium generation is Pg∗d = [81.2, 72.3, 25.1]
TMW. Note
that the time scale of each time step in the algorithm can be
20 minutes when the microgrids are active in updating their
strategies in this generation game. Then, the PMU-enabled
distributed algorithm reaches an equilibrium within 5 hours
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Fig. 6. (a) and (b) show the results of the renewable generations and
bus voltage angles of microgrids by using the iterative update algorithm,
respectively.
in this case study. For comparison, the decision updates of
microgrids enabled by the IUA are shown in Fig. 6. The IUA
converges to the equilibrium after 9 steps which is faster than
the distributed PDA. The reason is that all microgrids update
synchronously by using the centralized IUA. In addition, the
equilibrium strategies yielded by PDA and IUA in Figs. 5 and
6 are identical. Therefore, the proposed distributed algorithms
for generators and microgrids are effective in finding the
Stackelberg equilibrium solution in the two-layer interdepen-
dent generation game.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have established a Stackelberg game framework to
capture the power generation decisions of generators and
microgrids which are seen as leaders and followers, respec-
tively, in a smart grid. We have proposed fully distributed
schemes for both generators and microgrids to search for
the equilibrium strategy. The main required knowledge for
decision updates is only the voltage angles at buses which
can be obtained by PMU. Case studies have corroborated
our theoretical findings and designed algorithms. The future
research would be considering the cyber security issues in
the smart grids and implementing the designed algorithm
experimentally.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Proof. When the equilibrium solution P∗d is an inner point,
to show its uniqueness, one way is to show that matrix H is
invertible. Since S is of full rank, and base on the Sylvester’s
criterion, the upper left Nd-dimensional square matrix S1 in
S is also invertible. Note that determinant |S1| 6= 0 and it
satisfies |S1| = |H| ·
∏
i∈Nd sii. Because sii > 0, ∀i ∈ Nd,|H| 6= 0 and thus H is invertible. 
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Proof. First, we rewrite the constraint P = −Bθ as[
Pd
Pg
]
= −
[
B1 B2
B3 B4
][
θd
θg
]
,
where B :=
[
B1 B2
B3 B4
]
, B1 ∈ RNd×Nd , B2 ∈ RNd×Ng ,
B3 ∈ RNg×Nd , B4 ∈ RNg×Ng , and θ := [θTd ,θTg ]T . Then,
based on the constraints P = −Bθ and Pd = H−1q, we have
Pg = −B3θd −B4θg, (21)
H−1q = −B1θd −B2θg. (22)
From (22), θd can be expressed as
θd = −B−11 (H−1q + B2θg), (23)
since B1 is invertible. Plugging (23) into (21) yields Pg =
B3B
−1
1 (H
−1q + B2θg) − B4θg, which is equivalent to
(B3B
−1
1 B2 −B4)θg + B3B−11 H−1q = Pg . 
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Proof. To prove that matrix W is invertible, one way is
to show that all columns in W are linearly independent
and hence W is full-rank. Then, we aim to show that the
columns in C1 := [A1,0,T4 − I]T , C2 := [T3 − I,TT1 ,0]T
and C3 := [0,A2,T]T are linearly independent within each
matrix and across all others. We can check that [C1, C3] is
of full column rank, since A1 and A2 are diagonal matrices
with positive entries. Similarly, the next step is to show that
[C1, C2] and [C2, C3] are also of full column rank. By close
investigation, one sufficient condition that yields full column
rank of [C1, C2] and [C2, C3] is that matrix T1 is of full rank.
Then, our objective is to show that T1 = B3B−11 B2 −B4 is
invertible. This immediately follows from the facts that −T1
is the Schur complement of B1, and −T1 is invertible if
and only if matrix B is nonsingular [34]. Therefore, W is
invertible. 
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
Proof. Note that D is a lower triangular matrix. To proof
D is invertible, one way is to show that all its diagonal
elements are nonzero. First, we know that A1 is a diagonal
matrix with all diagonal entries greater than zero. Then, the
remaining part is to show that diagonal elements of T1 is
nonzero. Remind that T1 = B3B−11 B2−B4. For convenience,
denote B−11 = [s
1
ij ]i,j∈Nd . Then, based on Lemma 1, we
have s1ij ≤ 0, ∀i, j ∈ Nd. Since B is symmetric, then
BT3 = B2. In addition, the entries of B2 and B3 are
non-negative from definition. After algebraic calculations, we
obtain that matrix B3B−11 B2 ∈ RNg×Ng has non-negative
diagonal elements. Since the diagonal entries of B4 are smaller
than zero, then, T1 has all positive diagonal entries, and thus
D is invertible. 
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